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Cue self-relevance affects autobiographical memory
speciﬁcity in individuals with a history of
major depression
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Previously depressed and never-depressed individuals identified personal characteristics (self-guides)
defining their ideal, ought, and feared selves. One week later they completed the autobiographical
memory test (AMT). For each participant the number of AMT cues that reflected self-guide content was
determined to produce an index of AMT cue self-relevance. Individuals who had never been depressed
showed no significant relationship between cue self-relevance and specificity. In contrast, in previously
depressed participants there was a highly significant negative correlation between cue self-relevance and
specificity*the greater the number of AMT cues that reflected self-guide content, the fewer specific
memories participants recalled. It is suggested that in individuals with a history of depression, cues
reflecting self-guide content are more likely to prompt a shift to processing of information within the
long-term self (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), increasing the likelihood that self-related semantic
information will be provided in response to cues on the autobiographical memory test.
Research has consistently demonstrated that the
autobiographical memory of depressed indivi-
duals lacks specific detail. Most studies examining
this phenomenon have used the Autobiographical
Memory Test (AMT) in which participants are
presented with a series of cue words (e.g.,
‘‘Happy’’) and asked to come up with a memory
of a specific event that each word reminds them
of. When tested in this way, depressed individuals
tend to retrieve generic summaries of past ex-
perience (e.g., ‘‘birthdays’’) rather than memories
of specific events (e.g., ‘‘going swimming with my
friends on my birthday last year’’). This deficit has
been demonstrated across a range of populations
including individuals with major depression, sui-
cidal patients, mothers with postnatal depression,
and dysphoric students (see Williams et al., 2007).
Over-general memory (OGM) is linked to the
persistence of affective disturbance in depressed
populations (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, &
Ferrier, 1993; Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, & Kuy-
ken, 2001; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, &
Boom-Vermeeren, 2002; cf. Brewin, Reynolds, &
Tata, 1999) and is also observed in clinical groups
following recovery from depression (e.g., Brittle-
bank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Mackinger,
Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000;
Nadrino, Pezard, Poste, Reveillere, & Beaune,
2002; Spinhoven et al., 2006), suggesting that it
may represent a relatively stable marker of
vulnerability to depressive episodes.
In order to understand the mechanisms that
contribute to OGM in depression, it is helpful to
consider the phenomenon in the context of
models of normative memory functioning and
the relationship between autobiographical mem-
ory and the self. One contemporary model, shown
in Figure 1, is the ‘‘Self Memory System’’ of
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According to this model, autobiographical mem-
ories are the ‘‘transitory mental constructions’’ of
a self memory system (SMS), comprising the
working self, the episodic memory system, and
the long-term self. The function of the working
self is to initiate and monitor ongoing goal-
directed activity, and to control the storage and
retrieval of autobiographical memories. The long-
term self represents self-related autobiographical
knowledge in an abstract form, having two ele-
ments: the ‘‘conceptual self’’ (self-guides, sche-
mata, attitudes and beliefs etc.) and the
‘‘autobiographical knowledge base’’ (representa-
tions of an individual’s life story schema, distinct
lifetime periods, e.g., ‘‘when I lived in London’’,
and general events, e.g., ‘‘travelling to work by
tube in the mornings’’). Finally, the episodic
memory system encodes sensory perceptual re-
presentations of discrete events (e.g., the sights,
sounds, and smells of a particular subway jour-
ney), often in the form of visual imagery.
Within this model, specific autobiographical
memories are conceptualised as the product of
coordinated retrieval of sensory-perceptual infor-
mation from the episodic memory system and
contextualising information from the long-term
self. Over-general memories, in contrast, appear
to be dominated by information from the long-
term self. Indeed, while general event memories
(or ‘‘categoric memories’’ e.g., Williams &
Dritschel, 1988) are the most common ‘‘error’’
seen on the autobiographical memory test, re-
sponses that may be better thought of as output of
life story schema information or information from
the conceptual self are also observed.
Why might depressed individuals, and other
clinical groups who display over-general memory,
tend to respond with information from the long-
term self? One possibility relates to the suggestion
that autobiographical knowledge and autobiogra-
phical memories stored in the self memory system
are of primary importance to an individual’s
ability to evaluate progress towards goals (e.g.,
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). According to
the Self Memory System model, information
signalling challenges to goal progress (such as
the awareness of discrepancies between one’s
current circumstances and desired goals) will
prompt a shift of self memory system processing
priorities from the encoding and retrieval of
information in the episodic memory system
(‘‘adaptive correspondence’’) towards the long-
term self, with an increased emphasis on the
maintenance of self-coherence, such that ‘‘knowl-
edge based in the long-term self is likely to
dominate attention’’ (Conway et al., 2004, p. 495).
A considerable body of research has indicated
that depressive states and other forms of negative
affect are closely linked to the perception
of discrepancy from approach goals (often re-
ferred to as ‘‘ideal or ought self-guides’’) and
proximity to avoidance goals (‘‘feared self-
guides’’; e.g., Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999;
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Higgins,
Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman, 1989).
Rumination, which can also be regarded as a form
of discrepancy-based processing in which an
attempt is made to reduce the gap between a
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Figure 1. A summary of the self-memory system (SMS) as described by Conway et al. (2004).
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Wells, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000),
is also common during depressive episodes. If the
Self Memory System model is correct then
depressive episodes will be associated with the
increased salience of abstract autobiographical
information stored in the long-term self, more
extensive processing and elaboration of this
information, and an increased likelihood that
individuals will respond with such information
when asked to retrieve memories to cue words.
The observation that the induction of rumina-
tion (discrepancy-based processing) maintains
over-general memory in depressed patients,
whereas distraction reduces it (e.g., Watkins
et al., 2000), is supportive of this suggestion, as
are the findings of other studies demonstrating a
link between rumination and over-general mem-
ory in clinical samples (Park, Goodyer, & Teas-
dale, 2004; Raes et al., 2005). Further, Dalgleish
et al. (2003) hypothesised that over-general
memory may be particularly likely to occur if
cues forming the basis of a memory search
actually map on to, and hence directly prime,
concepts in the long-term self. These data suggest
that over-general memory may be observed when
an individual is prompted to shift to a mode of
processing that favours self-coherence (and facil-
itation of information in the long-term self) over
adaptive correspondence. This is most likely
following exposure to salient self-relevant infor-
mation, information related to important goals, or
to stimuli that promote rumination.
In what circumstances might we expect to see
the effects of priming of self-relevant concepts on
autobiographical memory? The most obvious
context is during episodes of depression. At
such times, the predominance of rumination,
negative self-referent thinking, and perceived
discrepancies from goals or ideals are likely to
ensure that the self memory system is focused on
the processing of information within the long-
term self, elaborating this content and producing
high levels of over-general memory. However, a
second context in which we might expect to see
effects of self-relevant priming is in previously
depressed individuals. The increased rehearsal of
abstract autobiographical knowledge during prior
periods of depressive rumination and the poten-
tial for self-referent cues to prime latent negative
self-schemas are suggested to increase the like-
lihood that previously depressed individuals,
relative to never-depressed controls, will experi-
ence a shift to processing information in the long-
term self when exposed to self-referent material.
Given the relative absence in recovery of other
factors (such as deficits in motivation and execu-
tive capacity) that may contribute to over-general
memory during depressive episodes, over-general
memory in previously depressed groups may be
particularly related on the extent to which
cues are salient and self-relevant, for example,
relating to an individual’s long-term goals or
ideals.
The study reported here examines the effects
of exposure to self-relevant material on autobio-
graphical memory specificity in individuals with a
history of depression and never-depressed con-
trols. Participants were asked to complete a ‘‘self-
guides’’ questionnaire (see Carver et al., 1999) in
which they listed personal characteristics defining
their ideal, ought, and feared selves (e.g., the
characteristics they felt they ought to have, would
ideally like to have, and most feared having). One
week after completing the questionnaire, particip-
ants completed a standard version of the AMT. It
was hypothesised that increased exposure to self-
relevant material on the AMT would be asso-
ciated with a general reduction in memory
specificity in previously depressed individuals,
but that this relationship would be attenuated or
absent in never-depressed controls. It was unclear
whether exposure to self-relevant information
would act to influence retrieval on a cue-by-cue
basis or would have a more pervasive impact on
retrieval. Therefore the specificity of responses to
self-relevant and non-self-relevant cues was com-




Advertisements in community buildings, in the
local newspaper, and on a community internet
site requested volunteers who had been depressed
in the past but were currently well, and indivi-
duals who had never been depressed. Individuals
who were interested in taking part were invited to
attend two experimental sessions at the Univer-
sity Department of Psychiatry. Participants were
paid £20 for participating in the study, which was
approved by University of Oxford, Central Re-
search Ethics Committee.
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A total of 21 individuals without a history of
major depression and 23 individuals with a history
of major depression participated in the study. A
further six individuals who reported significant
past depressive symptoms but did not meet full
criteria for past major depression (see later) were
interviewed but excluded. Additionally, one in-
dividual was excluded due to current mania
(which manifested itself in the week between
psychiatric interview and cognitive testing) and
two individuals were excluded as a result of
equipment failure.
All previously depressed participants were re-
covered at the time of participation in the study,
havinghadnooronlyminimalsymptomsforatleast
8weeks(Franketal.,1991;Keller,Shapiro,Lavori,
& Wolfe, 1982). More detailed assessment of
recovery as well as details of other psychiatric
disorders were established when participants at-
tended the Department of Psychiatry, using the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID:
First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1996). All inter-
viewswereconductedbyapost-doctoralclinicalor
research psychologist.
Other psychiatric diagnoses. The SCID inter-
view identified current psychiatric diagnoses in
two of the 21 individuals who had never been
depressed, with one case of current alcohol
dependence and one of current substance abuse.
In contrast, current psychiatric diagnoses were
identified in 12 of the 23 individuals with a history
of major depression.
1 Two individuals had specific
phobias and one individual had panic and specific
phobia in partial remission. One individual had
social phobia, one had agoraphobia, one panic
disorder, one panic disorder with agoraphobia in
partial remission, one alcohol abuse with PTSD,
and two PTSD in partial remission. Finally, one
individual had generalised anxiety disorder and
one individual had bulimia. These disorders were
of mild to moderate severity in all cases.
Procedure
Session 1 began with a discussion of the study and
thegatheringofwritteninformedconsent.Thiswas
followed by the clinical interview and the comple-
tionofseveralquestionnaires(thoseofrelevanceto
the current study are described below). A second
appointment was scheduled for approximately
1 week later. During this session, individuals
completed the autobiographical memory test, fol-
lowedbytheMill-HillVocabularyTestandRaven’s
Advanced Progressive Matrices, to assess current
cognitive functioning. Following these tasks, parti-
cipants were fully debriefed.
Questionnaires
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depres-
sion Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) is a well-established measure of depressive
symptomatology that contains 21 groups of state-
ments, referring to the presence of symptoms of
depression over the preceding 2 weeks.
Self-Description Questionnaire (Carver et al.,
1999). Participants completed a questionnaire in
which they were asked to describe three different
‘‘self-concepts’’: their ‘‘ought self’’, ‘‘ideal self’’,
and ‘‘feared self’’ (see Appendix for definition).
Participants first identified and listed seven char-
acteristics that described their ‘‘ought’’, ‘‘ideal’’,
and ‘‘feared’’self-concepts. They then copied each
of the characteristics onto a second page and first
rated their current similarity to each characteristic
on a scale ranging from 1 (‘‘presently I am the
opposite of this characteristic’’) to 7 (‘‘presently I
am just like this characteristic’’). In an addition to
the questionnaire of Carver et al., they then rated
the likelihood that they would possess each char-
acteristic in the future, and the importance of each
characteristic,againonscalesrangingfrom1(‘‘itis
very unlikely that I will have this characteristic in
the future’’/ ‘‘this characteristic is not important to
myxxxxself’’)to7(‘‘itisverylikelythatIwillhave
thischaracteristicinthefuture’’/‘‘thischaracteristic
is very important to my xxxx self’’).
Autobiographical memory test (AMT)
Participants were presented one at a time with a
series of cue words, which were read aloud by the
1 Additional past psychiatric diagnoses were identified in
15 of the 23 individuals with a history of major depression.
One individual had a past manic episode and a prior history of
anorexia, three had a lifetime history of alcohol abuse, four
had past dysthymia (one with a prior history of OCD), one had
a prior history of bulimia, one non-alcohol substance abuse
and dependence (cannabis), two alcohol dependence in
sustained full remission (one with panic in full remission),
two alcohol dependence in early full remission (one with
lifetime alcohol dependence and non-alcohol substance
dependence in full remission (cannabis, amphetamine), one
non-alcohol substance abuse (cannabis) in early full remission.
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screen. For each cue word, participants were
asked to report an event that had happened to
them of which the word reminded them*a
specific event, defined as an event that had lasted
less than a day and occurred at a particular time
and place. Three practice words were given to
participants, with practice continuing until speci-
fic memories had been recalled for at least two of
these three words. In the test phase, participants
were given 30 seconds to respond to each cue
word. To ensure that all individuals received the
same instructions, no prompts were given when a
first response was not specific and participants
were informed that they would not receive feed-
back on the specificity of their memories once the
test phase had begun. After 18 cues had been
presented (i.e., halfway through the task), the
instructions were briefly reiterated to all particip-
ants. Participants’ responses to each cue word
were recorded verbatim by the experimenter
and were also recorded on audio tape for later
rating.
For the current study, 36 words were used as
cues. Of these, 12 cue words related to interper-
sonal issues (affectionate, friendly, loved, sensi-
tive, caring, loyal, lonely, needy, rejected,
heartless, isolated, disliked), 12 related to
achievement issues (efficient, thorough, success-
ful, ambitious, able, determined, incompetent,
unproductive, inept, inefficient, failure, useless),
and 12 described emotional states (lively, happy,
calm, excited, glorious, lucky, upset, tired, bad,
awful, sad, bored), with 6 positive and 6 negative
words in each category. These words were
selected to increase the likelihood that cues
would overlap to some extent with participants’
self-guides. Words were identified from a larger
pool, with positive and negative words matched
for emotionality, frequency, and imageability on
the basis of ratings made by 25 individuals blind
to the research hypotheses. Words were presented
in one of two pseudo-random orders, counter-
balanced across participants.
Following previous studies, responses were
rated by the experimenter as specific (events
lasting less than a day), categoric (repeated
events), extended (events lasting longer than
one day), semantic associates of the cue word,
and omissions (no response; details of scoring
procedures for the AMT are available from the
authors).
Other cognitive tasks
In order to ensure that general cognitive perfor-
mance was matched between previously de-
pressed and never-depressed controls, two
cognitive tasks were administered.
Mill Hill Vocabulary Test. This test (Raven,
Raven, & Court, 1998) assesses a participant’s
ability to reproduce previously acquired knowl-
edge (crystallised intelligence), in this case word
meanings. A total of 66 target words requiring
definition were presented. For each target, parti-
cipants were required to select from six alter-
native words one that was most similar in
meaning to the target. The test was untimed,
with the total number of target words correctly
defined (out of a possible 66) recorded.
Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices   Set 1.
The progressive matrices (Raven, 1976) provide a
culture-fair test of fluid intelligence*the ability
to adapt reasoning skills to novel problems.
Participants were presented with 12 problems to
complete in 10 minutes. Each problem consisted
of a visual pattern in which one ‘‘piece’’ was
missing. Participants were required to select from
eight options the piece that correctly completed
the pattern. The total number of matrices cor-
rectly completed (out of 12) was recorded.
Deriving indices of AMT cue self-
relevance
Two indices of AMT cue self-relevance were
derived. First, we determined for each participant
the number of self-guides that were represented
by one or more AMT cue or AMT cue synonym.
To do this, a document was created that contained
each AMT cue (e.g., ‘‘affectionate’’) and each
cue’s synonyms (e.g., ‘‘loving’’, ‘‘demonstrative’’,
‘‘warm’’, ‘‘friendly’’, ‘‘kind’’), based on the syno-
nyms provided by the Thesaurus in Microsoft
Office Word 2003. This document was searched
electronically for each self-guide to identify exact
matches, and the total number of matches was
recorded. From time to time an individual re-
ported the same attribute as both an ‘‘ideal’’ and
an ‘‘ought’’ self-guide. Where these attributes
matched an AMT cue, they were counted twice,
as it was considered that the attribute was more
important to the individual’s sense of self.
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represented matches to self-guides. Although
some self-guides matched AMT cues exactly,
others matched synonyms of the cues. If a self-
guide had matched an AMT cue synonym, the
‘‘originating’’ cue was identified. The number of
originating cues was counted for each individual
to create an index of the number of AMT cues
that were self-relevant. This index differs from
the index corresponding to the number of self-
guides whose content was represented in the
AMT, because it was possible for two self-guides
to be synonyms of a single AMT cue (e.g., ‘‘kind’’
and ‘‘loving’’ are both synonyms of the AMT cue
‘‘caring’’). Identifying the originating cues also
allowed for a comparison of specificity of re-
sponses to self-relevant cues and non-relevant
cues on the AMT (see below).
RESULTS
Demographics
The mean age of the participants was 32.95 (SD 
12.66, range 18 62) years. Individuals with a past
history of depression (M 36.13, SD 13.92)
were somewhat older than those without such a
history (M 29.48, SD 10.35). However, there
was no significant difference between the groups
in mean age (U 186.00, Z  1.31, p  .19).
There were nine male participants in each group.
Past depressive symptoms
Among those individuals with a history of depres-
sion, mean age of onset of depressive symptoms
was 21.65 (SD 8.79) years. The median number
of past episodes of depression was 3 (M 6.83,
SD 9.71, range 1 40). Of the 23 individuals, 14
had experienced thoughts of death or suicide
during their worst episode of depression.
Current depression
Mean BDI score was 3.90 (SD 4.01) in the
never-depressed group and 6.26 (SD 7.05) in
the previously depressed group, with no signifi-
cant difference between the groups in current
depressive symptoms, F(1, 42) 1.81, MSE 
33.72, p  .18.
Cognitive tasks
Never-depressed and previously depressed parti-
cipants did not differ in their performance on the
Raven’s Matrices (Never Depressed: M 10.90,
SD 0.94; Previously Depressed: 10.81, SD 
1.22), F(1, 41) 0.07, MSE 1.20, p  .70. Nor
did they differ from one another on the Mill Hill
Vocabulary Test (Never Depressed: M 42.62,
SD 10.14; Previously Depressed: M 43.26,
SD 11.39) F(1, 42) 0.04, MSE 116.84, p 
.80, indicating that the two groups were well
matched in general cognitive abilities.
Self-description questionnaire
Similarity, likelihood, and importance ratings
for ideal, ought, and feared self-guides were
compared between groups. There was a trend
towards previously depressed participants report-
ing less similarity to ought self-guides than never-
depressed controls, F(1, 39) 3.62, MSE 65.32,
p  .06. There were no significant differences
between groups in similarity ratings for ideal or
feared self-guides (ps  .10), although mean dif-
ferences were in the expected direction (i.e., less
similarity to ideal self-guides and more similarity
to feared self guides in the previously depressed
group). Future likelihood ratings also did not
differ between groups (all ps .12), although
again mean differences were in the expected
direction. Previously depressed participants
tended to rate ideal, ought, and feared self-guides
as more important than never-depressed controls.
However these differences did not reach statistical
significance in any case (ps  .15). Descriptive
statistics for the self-description questionnaire are
shown in Table 1.
Autobiographical memory test (AMT)
Descriptive statistics for participants’ perfor-
mance on the AMT (number of responses that
were specific, extended, categoric, associates, and
omissions) are shown in Table 2. Visual inspection
of the data indicates that specific memories were
by far the most common response, but that in
cases where participants failed to retrieve a
specific memory, the most common response
was an omission. Univariate analysis of variance
revealed no significant difference between groups
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MSE 54.35, p  .30; extended memories: F(1,
42) 0.00, MSE 6.66, p  .99; categoric mem-
ories: F(1, 42) 0.53, MSE 7.45, p  .40; se-
mantic associates: F(1, 42) 1.53, MSE 7.55,
p  .20; or omissions: F(1, 42) 0.23, MSE 
25.46, p  .60. Given the relatively small number
of responses that fell into each category of non-
specific memory, number of specific memories
was used as the primary outcome variable in
subsequent analyses.
2
Number of self-guides represented
The mean number of self-guides that were
represented by an AMT cue or cue synonym
was M 6.29 (SD 3.16) for never-depressed
individuals and M 6.09 (SD 2.54) for pre-
viously depressed individuals. ANOVA indicated
no significant difference between groups in this
index of self-relevance, F(1, 42) 0.05, MSE 
8.15, p  .80. When this index was considered
separately for ideal, ought, and feared self-guides,
there were also no significant differences between
groups (all ps  .50).
Number of self-relevant AMT cues
The mean number of AMT cues that matched a
self-guide or had a synonym that matched a self-
guide was M 5.57 (SD 2.48) for never-de-
pressed individuals and M 5.09 (SD 1.98) for
previously depressed individuals. ANOVA indi-
cated no significant difference between the
groups in the number of self-relevant cues pre-
sented on the AMT, F(1, 42)  0.52, MSE 4.98,
p  .40.
Relationship between indices of cue
self-relevance
As expected, the two indices of cue-self rele-
vance, although distinct, were found to be highly
correlated (r  .84, pB .001). For clarity, further
analyses focus on the index corresponding to the
number of AMT cues that were self-relevant,
since this index is not influenced by repetition of
attributes across two self-guide domains.
Cue self-relevance and memory
specificity
A regression analysis was conducted to examine
the impact of previous MDD, cue self-relevance
(number of AMT cues that matched self-guides),
and the interaction between cue self-relevance
and previous MDD on the number of specific
memories retrieved by participants. Depression
status (never depressed, previously depressed)
was entered at Step 1. The index of cue self-
relevance was entered at Step 2 and the interac-
tion at Step 3 (see Table 3 for summary of
regression model). At Step 1, the regression
model was non-significant. At Step 2, there was
a significant improvement in the model, DF(1,
41) 5.22, p  .03, with the model becoming
significant at trend level, R
2 .14,F (2, 41) 
3.20, p  .051, and cue self-relevance entering as
a significant predictor of number of specific
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics for self-discrepancy questionnaire
Never depressed Previously depressed
Self-guide M SD M SD
Ideal
Similarity 32.11 6.55 30.05 5.39
Likelihood 37.83 5.25 35.05 5.63
Importance 41.56 3.36 43.05 3.69
Ought
Similarity 33.90 7.73 29.10 8.40
Likelihood 36.60 8.05 33.71 7.50
Importance 39.35 7.80 42.29 4.70
Feared
Similarity 20.95 7.00 24.81 9.12
Likelihood 20.57 7.24 24.04 10.06
Importance 39.71 5.31 41.83 6.86
Scores on each variable could range from 0 (lowest
similarity, importance, likelihood) to 49 (highest similarity,
importance, likelihood). For feared self-guides higher ratings
are more negative (i.e., more similarity to a feared self-
concept).
2 We examined number of specific memories rather than
proportion of specific memories (number of specific memories
controlling for omissions), because during debriefing most
participants reported that when they had made an omission
they actually had in mind non-specific content (for example,
semantic associates, or self-related thoughts), which they
withheld in order not to violate task instructions. It is
possible that when in recovery, improvements in cognitive
control reduce output of over-general memories*individuals
are better able to retain task instructions and withhold
incorrect responses. As such, omissions are likely to
represent a mixture of different types of over-general
response as well as true memory absences.
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interaction between past history of depression
and AMT cue self-relevance at Step 3, there was a
significant improvement in the model, DR
2  .21,
DF(1, 40) 12.69, p  .001, and the overall re-
gression model became highly significant, R
2 
.34, F(3, 40) 6.97, p  .001. The interaction
between cue self-relevance and past MDD en-
tered as a significant predictor of specificity (p 
.001), with the final model accounting for 34% of
the variance in number of specific memories
retrieved.
To examine the nature of the interaction
between cue self-relevance and specificity, Pear-
son’s correlation coefficients were calculated for
the relationship between number of specific
memories retrieved and number of self-relevant
cues presented, separately for individuals with
and without a history of major depression. These
indicated that while there was no significant
correlation between cue self-relevance and speci-
ficity in the never-depressed group (r  .07, p 
.70), there was a highly significant correlation in
the previously depressed group (r  .69, pB
.001). Thus, increased exposure to self-relevant
cues was associated with reduced retrieval of
specific memories, but only in individuals with a
history of major depression. Scatter plots depict-
ing these relationships are shown in Figure 2.
Specificity of responses to self-relevant
and non-self-relevant cues
In order to examine whether the presence of self-
relevant cues influenced only retrieval of specific
memories to those cues, or had a broader impact
on retrieval, the proportion of specific responses
given to self-relevant cues and non self-relevant
cues was calculated for each individual. Repeated
measures analysis of variance was used to com-
pare these two scores in individuals with and
without a history of major depression. This
analysis revealed no significant effect of cue
type, F(1, 41) 1.38, p  .25 and no significant
interaction between cue type and past MDD, F(1,
41) 1.08, p  .30. Because the mean number of
self-relevant cues was relatively low compared to
the total number of cues presented, in some cases
proportions were based on the very few responses
to self-relevant cues. An alternative way of
examining the pervasiveness of the effect of cue
self-relevance is to examine the effect of number
of self-relevant cues on specificity of responses to
cues that were not matches to self-guides. Pear-
son’s correlation coefficients revealed that in the
previously depressed group, the greater the num-
ber of self-relevant cues presented, the less
specific participants were in response to other,
non-self-relevant cues, r  .76, pB .001. In
contrast, in the never-depressed group, the pre-
sence of self-relevant cues had no impact on
specificity to non-self-relevant cues, r  .18,
p  .40.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine whether the
ability to retrieve specific autobiographical mem-
ories varies as a function of the self-relevance of
memory cues. Results indicated that in never-
depressed participants there was no systematic
relationship between cue self-relevance and spe-
cificity. In contrast, previously depressed particip-
ants showed a highly significant negative correla-
tion between the number of self-relevant cues
presented on the AMT and the ability to retrieve
specific autobiographical memories*the greater
the number of self-relevant cues presented, the
fewer specific memories participants recalled.
Regression analysis confirmed that history of
major depression moderated the association be-
tween cue self-relevance and specificity, with the
TABLE 2
Number of AMT responses falling into each category (36 items in total)
Never depressed Previously depressed
Type of response M (%) SD M (%) SD
Specific 24.48 (68%) 6.05 22.17 (61.6%) 8.39
Extended 3.05 (8.5%) 2.82 3.04 (8.4%) 2.34
Categoric 2.10 (5.8%) 1.87 2.70 (7.5%) 3.32
Associate 1.19 (3.3%) 1.72 2.22 (6.2%) 3.42
Omission 5.14 (14.3%) 3.82 5.87 (16.3%) 5.94
SELF-RELEVANCE AND MEMORY SPECIFICITY 319variance in specificity explained by the regression
model containing the interaction term rising to
approximately 30%. Subsequent analyses indi-
cated that the effect of exposure to self-relevant
cues had a general deleterious effect in the
previously depressed group, with specificity of
retrieval to non-self relevant cues also being
affected.
The current study examined the effects on
retrieval specificity of AMT cues whose content
reflected a participant’s self-guides (desired or
feared characteristics or attributes). The Self
Memory System model suggests that when
information that signals a challenge to goal
progress is presented, the processing of informa-
tion stored in the long-term self (e.g., general
event memories, lifetime period, life story
schema, and conceptual self-knowledge) will be
prioritised, with an emphasis on the maintenance
of self-coherence. Because, during depressive
episodes, individuals report marked discrepan-
cies from self-guides and spend significant
amounts of time engaged in depressive rumina-
tion (a form of discrepancy-based processing), it
was hypothesised that presentation of cues
relating to an individual’s self-guides would be
more likely to produce a shift towards processing
for self-coherence in the previously depressed
group, reinstating a form of processing that has
been over-rehearsed in the past. In addition,
information relating to goals and self-guides
stored within the long-term self may be more
elaborated in individuals with a history of
depression as a consequence of increased pro-
cessing during prior episodes, making such a
shift towards long-term self-processing more
difficult to override. Although speculative at
present, such a suggestion would be consistent
with other studies showing that in recovered
individuals with a history of depression, negative
cognitive biases remain latent and can be easily
reactivated, for example when individuals pro-
cess self-referent material in the context of
mood challenge or cognitive load (e.g., Scher,
Ingram, & Segal, 2005; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998).
The fact that increased cue self-relevance
influenced specificity of retrieval to all cues in
previously depressed participants, not just those
that were identified as matching self-guides, is
interesting. One possibility is that because the
cues on the AMT were selected to relate to
interpersonal issues, achievement issues, and emo-
tional states, the overlap in meaning between cues
was too great for distinct effects to be observed for
cues identified as matching or not matching self-
guides. However, it is also possible that exposure
to some self-relevant content may have been
sufficient to have a more persistent effect on
specificity. For example, previous research has
indicated that brief rumination inductions main-
tain over-generality and brief distraction induc-
tions reduce over-generality during subsequent
AMT testing (e.g., Watkins et al., 2000), and it also
appears that over-general memory increases
across repeated trials in individuals with low
self-esteem relative to those with high self-esteem
(Roberts & Carlos, 2006). These findings may
reflect the cumulative effects of activation of self-
related content on retrieval in vulnerable groups.
Further research incorporating distinct neutral
cues would be required to clarify the scope of
any effect of cue self-relevance on specificity.
A number of limitations should be borne in
mind when interpreting the current results. First,
although individuals with a history of depression
did not differ significantly from never-depressed
controls in ratings of self-discrepancy, in all cases
mean differences were in the expected direction,
suggesting that self-guide cues may have been
more salient for those with a history of MDD.
TABLE 3
Regression model examining the contribution of past history of MDD and cue self-relevance to the prediction of
number of specific memories retrieved on the AMT
Variable B SE B b tp
Model 1 Past MDD  2.30 2.23 .16  1.03 .31
Model 2 Past MDD  2.84 2.13  .20  1.33 .19
Cue Self-Relevance  1.11 .49  .33  2.28 .03
Model 3 Past MDD 13.57 4.98 .93 2.73 .009
Cue Self-Relevance .17 .56 .05 .30 .77
Past MDD* Cue Self-Relevance  3.11 .87  1.23  3.56 .001
Model 1: R
2 .03, F(1, 42) 1.07, p .31.
Model 2: R
2 .14,F (2, 41) 3.20, p .051, DR
2 .11, DF(1, 41) 5.22, Sig DFp  .03.
Model 3: R
2 .34, F(3, 40) 6.97, p .001, DR
2 .21, DF(1, 40) 12.69, Sig DFp  .001.
320 CRANE, BARNHOFER, WILLIAMSAdditionally we measured self-guides 1 week
before completion of the AMT, in order to reduce
the likelihood that participants would see a link
between the two tasks. However, it is possible
that individuals with a history of depression show
more stability in their ratings of self-guides (for
example due to prolonged periods of rumination
on these issues in the past). If this was the case, it
is plausible that the measure of self-relevance of
AMT cues would be more accurate for the
previously depressed than the never-depressed
group. Further research is required to address this
possibility as well as to examine the extent to
which the effect of self-relevance on specificity is
restricted to discrepant self-relevant information.
Second, in the current study there was no
significant effect of history of depression on
memory specificity. While several studies have
identified persisting over-generality in previously
depressed patients (e.g., Brittlebank et al., 1993;
Spinhoven et al., 2006), others have failed to find
such an effect (e.g., Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995;
Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach,
2001; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, & Beck, 2005).
It is possible that differences between studies may
relate to the extent to which different samples
had residual symptoms, or had experienced past
trauma, the proximity of the most recent depres-
sive episode, or the number of depressive epi-
sodes an individual has experienced (e.g.,
Nandrino et al., 2002). Additionally, given the
current findings, it is possible that studies have
differed by chance in the extent to which AMT
cues primed previously depressed participants’
core concerns.
Third, many of the previously depressed parti-
cipants were experiencing other psychiatric symp-
toms at the time of testing. In most cases these
were anxiety disorders, which do not usually
appear to be associated with over-general mem-
ory (e.g., Burke & Matthews, 1992; Wenzel,
Jackson, & Holt, 2002). However, the presence
of these disorders may have acted to increase the
likelihood that self-relevant cues would activate
information stored in the long-term self, and it
would therefore be premature to assume that the
effect of self-relevance on memory specificity is a
feature related specifically to a history of depres-
sion. Finally, while there was no difference
between the groups in the extent to which AMT
cues were self-relevant, it remains possible that
some third factor may have contributed to the
association between self-relevance and specificity
seen in the previously depressed participants in
this study.
There has been little previous research exam-
ining the impact of cue self-relevance on the
ability to retrieve specific autobiographical mem-
ories (though see Spinhoven et al., 2007, this
issue). Although preliminary, this study provides
evidence to suggest that the presence of self-
relevant memory cues may contribute to over-
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Figure 2. Relationship between the number of self-relevant AMT cues and number of speciﬁc memories recalled in never-
depressed (A) and previously depressed (B) participants.
SELF-RELEVANCE AND MEMORY SPECIFICITY 321general retrieval in previously depressed indivi-
duals, as a result of the increased tendency of
conceptual self-relevant information to capture
attention. It has been demonstrated that both
brief experimental manipulations (e.g., Watkins
et al., 2000) and clinical interventions (e.g.,
Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000) that
facilitate disengagement from analytical self-fo-
cused thinking produce decreases in over-general
autobiographical memory. The current findings
further emphasise the importance of self-related
processing in the manifestation of over-generality
in depression and, although in need of replication,
suggest that the integration of research examining
self-related processing with research examining
autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Conway
et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2007) may provide
valuable insights into how these aspects of cogni-
tive functioning determine persisting vulnerability
to depression.
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APPENDIX
Definitions of ought, ideal, and feared
selves
The ‘‘ought self’’ was described as ‘‘the kind of
person you believe you have a duty or obligation
to be, or that you believe people think you should
be. It’s defined by the personality characteristics
you think you ought to possess, or feel obligated
to possess. It’s not necessary that you have these
characteristics now, only that you believe you
ought to have them.’’
The ‘‘ideal self’’ was described as ‘‘The kind of
person you’d really like to be. It’s defined by the
personality characteristics you would ideally like
to have. It’s not necessary that you have these
characteristics now, only that you believe you
want to have them.’’
The ‘‘feared self’’ was described as ‘‘the kind of
person that you fear being, worry about being, or
dislike being. It’s defined by the personality
characteristics that you think you might have
now or in the future, but that you would rather
not have. It’s not necessary that you have these
characteristics now, only that you do not want to
have them, or want to avoid having them.
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